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[Excerpt] Traditionally, commission rates were set by local boards of realtors. However, shortly after the 
inception of the Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”), the Federal Trade Commission began requiring brokers 
to disclose that commissions were “not set by any governing body and [were] negotiable between the 
Seller and the Listing Broker.” 1 Despite this disclosure requirement, the tradition of charging a standard 
commission percentage and equally splitting this commission between brokers continued. While a chorus 
of voices alleged collusion, the standard commission rate appears to have resulted from competitive 
market forces pushing rates to their lowest level.2 However, in the 1990s, as Limited Service Discount 
Brokers (“LSDB”) started taking market share from traditional brokers, the traditional brokers began to 
lower their commission rates to compete with these LSDB. The market driven commission rates dropped 
from the standard six percent to a range between four to five percent. Although most LSDB proved to be 
unprofitable and unsustainable, the lower commission rates have prevailed. 
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Introduction
Traditionally, commission rates were set by local boards of realtors.  However, shortly 
after the inception of the Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”), the Federal Trade Commission 
began requiring brokers to disclose that commissions were “not set by any governing 
body and [were] negotiable between the Seller and the Listing Broker.” 1  Despite this 
disclosure requirement, the tradition of charging a standard commission percentage 
and equally splitting this commission between brokers continued.  While a chorus of 
voices alleged collusion, the standard commission rate appears to have resulted from 
competitive market forces pushing rates to their lowest level.2 However, in the 1990s, as 
Limited Service Discount Brokers (“LSDB”) started taking market share from traditional 
brokers, the traditional brokers began to lower their commission rates to compete with 
these LSDB.  The market driven commission rates dropped from the standard six percent 
to a range between four to five percent.  Although most LSDB proved to be unprofitable 
and unsustainable, the lower commission rates have prevailed.
Brokers’ primary form of price competition is through lower commission rates, 
which pushes rates down over time, and creates various commission rate levels at a 
given time. By analyzing 16,112 residential real estate transactions occurring in three New 
Jersey counties during the 2001 to 2003 time period, this paper studies the effects that 
different buyer broker commissions offered through the MLS had on market transaction 
performance to determine if  lower commission rates vis-à-vis higher commission rates 
have hurt consumers ceteris paribus.  In effect, if a listing agent offered a lower buyer 
broker commission, did the performance of the transaction diminish? Because the buyer 
broker commission is the compensation that the buyer broker is paid for his effort, 
one would expect a listing offering a lower commission to result in both less effort and 
less interest from buyer brokers (known as “steering” 3), resulting in weaker market 
performance of the transaction.  However, a statistical analysis of the above-mentioned 
New Jersey transaction data demonstrated that there is not a statistically significant 
association between buyer broker commission rates and the days on market of residential 
real estate transaction. Our study does demonstrate a statistically significant association 
between the buyer broker commission rate and the likelihood a property will sell at a 
discount.  Though contrary to common wisdom, a one percent increase in the buyer 
broker commission rate is associated with a sales price discount of .5% from the listing 
price.
The lack of statistical significance between buyer broker commission and days on 
market may be caused by low barriers to entry to becoming a real estate agent.  The low 
barriers to entry likely create a surplus of agents resulting in fierce competition. The fierce 
competition does not allow the buyer broker the luxury of choosing which commission 
1 Federal Trade Commission, The Residential Real Estate and Brokerage Industry: Los Angeles Regional Office Staff Report 
Volumes I and II and the Butters Report 9 (1983), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/workshop/index.htm. From here after “Federal Trade Commission”.
2 Corgel, Ling, Smith. Real Estate Perspectives, McGraw Hill/ Irwin, New York, NY 2001, Pages 524.
3 Steering refers to any action taken by a broker or agent to avoid cooperating with a particular competitor.
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rate he will work for.  Instead the buyer broker has to take what he can get, be it 2.0% 
or 3.0% commission, because if he does not take it someone else will. The buyer broker 
knows that if he does a good job on this transaction, the buyer will likely use him to 
sell his home in the future.  The buyer broker probably will work just as hard on the 
transaction regardless of the commission rate. Additionally, the difference in commission 
amount is quite small.  For the average priced home, the difference between a 3.0% and 
a 2.5% buyer broker commission is $945.  This amount is likely not enough to affect the 
transaction through altered buyer broker behavior.  Furthermore, it is possible that the 
discount is the result of listing agents offering a higher buyer broker commission for 
properties that they deem more difficult to sell, and hence those properties sell for a 
discount.  Additionally, the internet has allowed consumers to find listings on the internet, 
diminishing buyer broker’s ability to ‘steer’ consumers.
The Residential Real Estate Market
According to the National Association of REALTORS®, the housing sector accounts 
for fifteen percent of U.S. gross domestic product. Seventy-four percent of U.S. households 
own their homes.  In total, these homeowners have over $4 trillion of equity in their 
homes!  This home equity is essential to the economy and has fueled much of America’s 
consumer spending during the past decade.4 
Unfortunately, this equity accumulation is quickly evaporating. In the first quarter 
of 2009, existing home prices and new home prices fell 15% and 13.5%, respectively.  In 
2008, the existing U.S. home average sales price fell to $216,000 from $268,200 in 2006, a 
decrease of 20%!  Existing home sales volume fell 22% during the time period between 
December 2007 and December 2008.5 The decreases in home value and transaction volume 
negatively impact the brokerage industry.  As home prices fall and transaction volume 
decreases, the performance of each transaction becomes increasingly more important to 
the brokers involved.  This trend also impacts homeowners.  Homeowners are having a 
more difficult time selling their homes and are receiving less money than they previously 
would have received.  Real estate agents are confronted with fewer transactions, falling 
home prices (which equates to lower real pay to the agent because the agent’s earnings 
(i.e. commission) are a function sale price), and tough competition.  Buyers are having 
a difficult time obtaining financing, and are being required to put more equity into 
the houses that they do purchase.  This increases the risk to the buyer and elevates the 
importance of the buyer broker providing sound advice and diligent work to the buyer. 
Real Estate Brokerage 
The residential real estate market is characterized by complex, confidential and 
infrequent market transactions, with heterogeneous product and high information and 
transaction costs.6 Purchasing a home is often the single largest financial decision made 
by a buyer in his lifetime, and represents, on average, over 30% of a family’s net worth.  
A National Association of Realtors 2008 survey reports that, in 2007, 84% of sellers were 
assisted by a real estate agent when selling their home and 81% of buyers used a real 
estate agent to purchase their home.7  Only 13% of homeowners chose to forego paying a 
commission and attempt to sell their home as a For-Sale-By-Owner (“FSBO”).
4 National Association of REALTORS®, “Structure, Conduct, and Performance of the Real Estate Brokerage Industry,” 
November 2005, http://www.realtor.org/research.nsf/pages/competitioninrealestateresearch, Available February 12, 2009.
5 National Association of Realtors: NAR Forecast, December 2008, http://www.realtor.org/research Available February 16, 2009.
6 Elder, Zumpano, Baryla. Buyer Search Intensity and the Role of the Residential Real Estate Broker, Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, 18:3, 351-168, 1999.
7 National Association of Realtors 2008 Survey of Home Buyers and Sellers, Available February 16, 2009.
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A seller hires a real estate agent for several reasons, including, but not limited to, the 
following:
to handle the complicated forms,•	
to decrease the seller’s liability•	
to guide the seller on pricing and timing,•	
to aid in obtaining financing, and•	
to negotiate with the buyer.•	
In addition to hiring an agent for the aforementioned benefits, many sellers believe 
a real estate agent will help them obtain the highest price for their home.  However, 
empirical evidence on this subject proves inconclusive.  Buyers often enlist the services 
of an agent to improve the efficiency of their search.  They hire this professional to direct 
them to homes that are better suited to their preferences and circumstances, making it 
more likely that they will find a satisfactory home.8
The real estate brokerage industry is extremely competitive.  There are approximately 
2.5 million real estate professionals licensed in the U.S., including 200,000 brokers.  The 
industry has low barriers to entry, constraining broker commissions.  Ninety percent 
of licensed real estate agents are self-employed independent contractors that work on 
commission, measured as a percentage of a home’s sale price.  Real estate brokerages 
operate using numerous different business models ranging from discount limited service 
brokerages to non-discount full service providers.  The real estate brokerage industry is 
also constrained in its pricing because homeowners have the option to sell their home as 
a for-sale-by-owner (“FSBO”) if they think that the costs of using a real estate professional 
exceed the value of doing so. 
A firm must be licensed in the state in which it plans to operate as a brokerage firm.  
Sales agents must also be licensed in their state of operation and are required to work for 
a broker.  Brokerage firms and agents earn their revenue through commissions generated 
by selling homes.  A typical commission amounts to 4% to 6% of the home sales price.  
This amount gets split between the seller’s broker and buyer’s broker.  Brokers and 
agents then split the commission again, such that a 6% commission gets split 4 ways.  
The brokerage firm’s expenses, which include rent and occupancy, office, advertising, 
licensing, insurance, recruiting, training, and local real estate board fees, are paid with 
these commissions.9 Given the competitiveness of the market, broker profits are low.  In 
1996, the average real estate brokerage firm earned profits of just 2.3% of the firm’s gross 
revenue.  Although market wide commission rates are not available, an estimate of the 
average current commission rates being charged in the U.S. can be derived by dividing 
the total market revenues of the real estate brokerage industry by existing home sales 
volume.  Assuming that real estate brokerage represents a $60 to $70 billion industry, 
and an existing home sales volume of $1.3 to $1.4 trillion (excluding FSBOs), the average 
commission rates range from 4.3% to 5.4%.10 According to a 2004 National Association 
of REALTORS® study, the typical agent worked 45 hours a week and had an income of 
$49,300, a 5% decline from 2002 income of $52,000.  During the same time period, the 
number of licensed real estate agents grew by 26 percent.  This increase in the number of 
agents and the decrease in commission rates account for the decline in brokerage income 
despite the booming housing market.11
8 Elder et al, supra note 7. 
9 Baron, J and Tayan, B, Keller Williams Realty, Stanford Graduate School of Business, 4/12/07. 
10 National Association of REALTORS®, supra note 5. These commission rates represent the brokerage industry revenues as a 
percentage of existing home sales. 
11 Ibid.
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When home owners use real estate agents to list and sell their property, the agent 
enters the home information into a Multiple Listing Service (“MLS”) Database. Through 
more than 800 MLS databases, brokers share information on properties they have listed 
and invite other brokers to cooperate in their sale in exchange for compensation if they 
bring a buyer.  Participation in the MLS is limited to licensed real estate brokers, but not 
open to the general public.12
A real estate salesperson can work with a consumer as a buyer’s agent, a listing 
agent, or as a dual agent.  An agency relationship is created between a seller and a broker 
when both parties agree to a listing contract; similarly, an agency relationship is created 
between a buyer and a broker by a contract usually called a buyer agency agreement.  In 
both cases, the broker must act as the consumer’s fiduciary.  The broker must be open 
and honest with his principal and may not disclose confidential information about his 
principal, the principal’s financial status, or the principal’s motivations.  Although the 
recent trend has favored use of a single agency agreement, in the past, use of a dual 
agency was common.  Under dual agency, the broker acts as an agent of both the seller 
and the buyer.  The broker owes equal, but not undivided, loyalty to both principals.  This 
inherently conflicting arrangement has the potential to lead to conflicts of interest.  
In 2008, the number of existing home sales was down to a low of 4,740,000 from 
6,478,000 in 2006.  Despite this decrease in transaction volume (and home prices), as of 
December 2008, the number of real estate agents was greater than ever.  The real estate 
brokerage industry remains highly competitive.13
The Evolution of Realtor Compensation
Commission rates are typically standard across a market for a given time period, 
which has incited investigations into collusion by the FTC. These investigations resulted 
in a regulation by the FTC that forced brokers to disclose that commissions were “not set 
by any governing body and [were] negotiable between the Seller and the Listing Broker.”14 
As a result, the Boards of Realtors, who once mandated commission rates charged by 
MLS members, could no longer do so.  Despite the disclosure requirement, the tradition 
of charging a standard commission percentage with equal splits between brokers had 
become institutionalized. 
The practice of equally splitting the commission between the buyer broker and the 
listing broker discontinued as technological advancement brought about the arrival 
of the “dot.com” real estate business model known as the Limited Service Discount 
broker (“LSDB”). By way of the internet, and through exploitation of the MLS, the LSDB 
attempted to create a perception that they were able to offer the consumer all of the 
traditional marketing services of a full-service broker at a discounted commission. The 
internet gave consumers direct access to property information; in turn, real estate agents 
lost proprietary control over this information.  These issues, along with the relative 
homogeneity of broker services, regardless of brand, led traditional full-service brokers to 
reduce their commission rates as a means to remain competitive. 
The LSDB model ultimately proved to be unprofitable. To enhance their profit margin, 
LSDBs retained a greater portion of the brokerage fee as the listing broker, while offering 
a reduced fee to act as the buyer broker.  The LSDB model did have a lasting effect on the 
industry.    Traditional brokers followed the path of the LSDBs and began to offer lower 
12 National Association of REALTORS®, Talking Points: Multiple Listing Service, http://www.realtor.org/press_room/public_
affairs/tpmls, Available February 16, 2009.
13 National Association of REALTORS®, Existing Home Sales and Prices Overview, http://www.realtor.org/research/research/
ehsdata, Available April 22, 2009.
14 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 1.
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commission to the buyer broker. This allowed the listing broker to continue to earn the 
same commission for themselves despite an overall lower commission.  This trend, while 
beneficial to the listing broker, may prove detrimental to the seller and buyer.  
Conceptually, the commission constitutes a reward for service provided.  In 
theory, a reduced commission would only serve to discourage an agent’s performance.  
Interestingly, commission rates have been falling over time, although the median home 
prices have been rising such that the average commission fee has risen over time as Table 
1 illustrates. 
Table 115    
 
Table 2     
 
Table 2 is constructed using our data and is inflation adjusted for the year 2003.
The annual percent changes in real housing prices and commission fees tend to move 
in tandem. For example, Weicher calculates that although the average commission rate as 
reported by REAL Trends (Table 1) fell by 16% (6.1% to 5.1%), because the average price of 
existing housing increased during this period ($128,400 to $236,000), the average inflation-
adjusted commission per transaction increased by 11% in dollar terms between 1991 and 
2004.16 Table 2 shows a less pronounced, but similar trend to the national data reported in 
Table 1. Our data reports only the buyer broker commission rate, while the REAL Trends 
data reports the total commission. Both data sets report the same thing: commissions are 
falling. According to our data, from 2001 to 2003 the median buyer broker commission 
decreased 1.88%, most likely due to price competition amongst brokers whom undercut 
15 Adapted From A Report by the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice: Competition In the Real Estate 
Brokerage Industry, April 2007, available at ( www.ftc.gov/reports/realestate/V050015.pf).
Sources: Commission rates are from REAL TRENDS 500©; real median home prices are from U.S. Department of Housing and 
Urban Development, U.S. Housing Market Conditions, 4th Quarter 2006, Table 6-9 (Feb. 2007), and are a weighted average of 
new and existing home prices, based on annual sales; median home prices are converted into 2006 dollar with consumer price 
index for all goods for all urban consumers (CPI_U) from Bureau of Labor Statistics, available at (http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/
SurveyOutputServlet); commission fees are calculated by multiplying commission rates by real median home prices.
16 Weicher, John C, The Price of Residential Real Estate Brokerage Services: A Review of the Evidence, Such As It Is, (presented 
at AAI Conference on Competition in the Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry Nov. 8, 2005). Weicher’s calculations use 
average home sales prices, not median home sales prices.78 Cornell Real Estate REview
each other to gain business. The commission constitutes a reward for service provided. 
Despite an agent’s fiduciary duty to his client, the sheer volume of homes gives agents 
the power to serve their own interests.  The typical home buyer searches for eight weeks 
and views 10 homes.17  There are typically more than 10 properties that fit the buyer’s 
search criteria.  The buyer’s agent has significant discretion to “steer” the buyer to 
particular properties.  As the 2007 Federal Trade Commission Staff Report notes, brokers 
have certain incentives to “steer” consumers toward those homes that offer the highest 
cooperating broker commission payment and away from homes listed by brokers known 
to charge home sellers discounted commission rates. As such, brokers can take advantage 
of their superior knowledge of market conditions by steering clients away from home 
listings that otherwise match the criteria identified by the consumers, but provide lower 
financial gains for the broker than other homes.18 The ability to “steer” clients is aided 
by the practice of never publicly showing the commission rate offered. Only licensed 
real estate agents have access to the commission rate information, such that a consumer 
would never know that a broker screened listings based on commission rates.19 The 
1983 FTC report further describes the problems at hand: “because many buyers think 
they are seeing all the properties a broker or salesperson knows to be on the market, the 
practice of steering coupled to the general practice of denying consumers direct access 
to information from a MLS may mislead buyers.”20 Disparities in commission rates can 
occur because competition among brokers primarily occurs through lower commission 
rates.21 If a listing agent offers a below average commission to the buyer broker, does the 
transaction perform below average? Is the FTC’s concern valid? i.e., does the practice of 
steering buyers cause properties with lower commission rates to perform worse on the 
market due to decreased buyer broker interest? This study attempts to empirically answer 
the previous questions and determine whether reducing the compensation of the buyer 
agent, compared to the prevailing average commission rate common at a specific time 
and location, diminishes the value of services being provided to the buyer and seller.  The 
results of this study should help sellers and listing agents decide what commission rate to 
offer the buyer broker.
Brokerage Compensation 
Structure and Housing Transactions
Real estate brokerage compensation has been a hotly debated topic. To date, most 
literature compares the effects of percentage commission and flat-fee listings on agent 
performance. However, this paper is not concerned with different compensation 
structures between broker and agent.  Rather, this paper focuses on the impact the level 
of compensation given by the listing agent to the buyer agent has on the transaction’s 
performance.  
As described above, until the 1990s, buyers typically worked with agents, who were 
paid by the listing agent and recognized by the law as subagents of the listing agent’s 
firms.  As subagents of the seller, the buyer agent had a fiduciary duty to the seller’s 
agent, requiring him to pass along any secrets that the buyer shared with him, even 
17 National Association of Realtors 2008 Survey of Home Buyers and Sellers, (February 16, 2009).
18 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 1.
19 See Brokeck, S., and Woodall, P., Consumer Federation of America, State Real Estate Regulation: Industry Dominance and It’s 
Consumer Costs 3 (July 2006), available at
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFA_Real_Estate_Commissioner_Report.pdf.
20 Federal Trade Commission, supra note 1.
21 A Report by the Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice: Competition In the Real Estate Brokerage Industry, 
April 2007, available at ( www.ftc.gov/reports/realestate/V050015.pf).
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to the detriment of the buyer.  To remedy this conflict, the concept of the buyer agent 
evolved.  Today, about 81% of buyers use an agent.22 Interestingly, most buyer agents rely 
on the fees offered by listing brokers, instead of negotiating their fee with the buyer.  This 
reliance is facilitated by the MLS, which requires members to list a commission offered to 
the buyer agent if the buyer agent produces a ready, willing and able buyer.
Nadel argues that, under certain circumstances, allowing the listing agent to set the 
buyer agent’s fee can lead the buyer agents to withhold options from the buyer, despite 
fiduciary duties to the contrary.23 Those circumstances include 1) the co-operation fee 
offered to the buyer agent for a home is too low, 2) the seller appears to expect free 
assistance from the buyer agent, or 3) the agent wants to discourage price competition. 
Nadel further argues that this practice of fee setting violates duties imposed by state laws 
of agency and that they also conflict with the first principle of loyalty in the National 
Association of Realtors “stringent, enforceable” code of ethics. Yavas and Cowell 
further substantiate Nadel’s claim by noting that “compensating […] buyer brokers as 
if they were subagents suggests a profound misalignment of buyer and buyer broker 
incentives,”24 because the buyer broker gets paid more when the buyer pays more for a 
house.  
Several authors have tried to empirically study the effects that brokers and 
agents have on the residential housing market.25 These studies have reached differing 
conclusions, illustrating the complexities of the topic.  Janssen and Jobson (1980) found 
that real estate agents have an influence on price.26  Jud (1983) found that brokers do 
not affect the price of the houses they sell.  However, brokers do appear to influence the 
level of housing consumed by buyers.27 Jud and Frew (1986) found that broker-assisted 
buyers have a greater demand for houses than those without the assistance of a broker.  
Their results suggest that the broker plays a screening role for the seller, matching up 
buyers and sellers.28 Zumpano, Elder, Baryla (1996) found that home buyers with high 
opportunity costs and the least information about local housing market conditions 
were most likely to seek out the services of real estate professionals.29 Their study also 
demonstrated that, after taking into account the buyer choice process, the real estate 
broker has no appreciable, independent influence on selling price; this suggested that 
the housing market was non-segmented and competitive.  Baryla and Zumpano (1995) 
found that real estate brokers are able to reduce the search time for virtually all classes 
of consumers.30 Elder, Zumpano, and Baryla (1999) found that, in addition to reducing 
buyer search duration, the buyer broker mechanism also increased the search intensity.  
Having more market access and housing information than buyers working without 
brokers, broker-assisted consumers were able to visit more homes during a given time 
period. These results suggest that buyers with high information and search costs are more 
22 Supra, note 21.
23 Nadel, M.S., A Critical Assessment of the Traditional Residential Real Estate Broker Commission Rate Structure, Cornell Real 
Estate Review Vol. 5, 2008.
24 Yavas, A, and Colwell P., Buyer Brokerage: Incentive and Efficiency Implications, Journal of Real Estate Finance and 
Economics, 18:3, 259-277, 1999.
25 This summary is adapted from Elder, Zumpano, Baryla. 2000. Buyer Brokers: Do They Make a Difference? Their Influence on 
Selling Price and Search Duration, Real Estate Economics, 28: 2; 337
26 Janssen, C.T.L. and J.D. Jobson. Applications and Implementation on the Choice of Realtor. Decisions Sciences, 11: 299-311, 
1980.
27 Jud, G.D. Real Estate Brokers and the Market for Residential Housing. The AREUEA Journal, 11: 69-81, 1983.
28 Jud, G.D. and J. Frew. Real Estate Brokers, Housing Prices, and the Demand for Housing. Urban Studies, 23: 21-31, 1986.
29 Zumpano, L.V., H. Elder and E.A. Baryla. Buying a House and the Decision to Use a Real Estate Broker. Journal of Real Estate 
Finance and Economics, 13: 169-181, 1996.
30 Baryla, E.A and L.V. Zumpano. Buyer Search Duration in the Residential Real Estate Market: The Role of the Real Estate 
Agent. Journal of Real Estate Research, 10: 1-14, 1995.80 Cornell Real Estate REview
likely to seek out the services of real estate brokers.31  Finally, Elder, Zumpano and Baryla 
(2000) found that buyer agents are more effective at reducing search time for their clients 
than more traditional listing agents or non-agent facilitators.32 This study attempts to 
further the discussion by examining the impact that buyer broker compensation, and the 
ability of buyer brokers to “steer” the consumer, have on the market performance of the 
residential real estate transaction. 
The Data 
This study uses 16,112 broker-assisted residential real estate transactions obtained 
from Multiple Listing Services in Mercer County, Somerset County, and Hunterdon 
County, NJ, for the time period from 2000 through 2004.  These three counties are located 
in North-Central NJ and situated about an hour from Philadelphia and New York City.  
Table 3 displays the relevant housing data for each County.
Table 3
The data contains the following variables:
1.   Listing Date: the date that a property was listed for sale.
2.   Off Market Date: The date that a listing was taken off market and put under   
  contract.
3.   List Price: the listing price for a property.
4.   Sale Price: the sale price for a property.
5.  Commission:  the buyer broker commission rate offered by the listing broker.
6.   County:  the county in which a transaction occurred; here, Hunterdon, Mercer, or  
  Somerset County.
The Methodology
This study analyzes how buyer agent commission rates influence transaction 
performance.  Transaction performance has been measured in the following two ways: 
1. Days on Market (DOM):
 DOM is defined as the number of days between the listing date and off market   
  date.  DOM measures how fast an agent helped to implement a transaction or   
  how quickly a listed property was sold.
2. Transaction Premium (PREMIUM):
 The transaction premium is defined as follows:
31 Elder, H., L.V. Zumpano and E.A. Baryla. Buyer Search Intensity and the Role of the Residential Real Estate Broker. Journal of 
Real Estate Finance and Economics, 18: 351-368, 1999.
32 Elder, Zumpano, Baryla. Buyer Brokers: Do They Make a Difference? Their Influence on Selling Price and Search Duration, 
Real Estate Economics, 28: 2; 337, 2000.
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The transaction premium reflects the strength of a listing on the housing market. The 
aggregation of this measure also reflects the relative strength of demand (to supply) in the 
marketplace at a particular time and location. 
This study is premised on two regression equations.  The first equation captures 
the market performance of a transaction by determining the total days on market for a 
listing.  The following regression equation analyzes the set of variables that affect the 
time between listing date and off market date, denoted as Days on Market (DOM), for a 
particular transaction:
 
DOM = a + b1 Log_LP + b2 COMMISSION +b3 PREMIUM DUMMY + b4 WEEKEND + b5 SPRING + 
      b6 COUNTY + b7 YEAR + e          (1)  
  
The second equation measures market performance by normalizing the sale price as a 
discount or premium of the listing price, denoted by PREMIUM.  Equation (2) is defined 
as:
PREMIUM = a + b1 Log_LP + b2 COMMISSION +b3 DOM + b4 WEEKEND + b5 SPRING + 
b6 COUNTY + b7 YEAR + e           (2)
 
The control variables used in the regression are derived from previous research and/
or anecdotal evidence provided by parishioners.  Log_LP, the natural log of the listing 
price, is used to control the size of a listed property.  We do not have information on 
housing characteristics with individual transaction to control hedonic factors. However, 
listing price should reflect the pricing differences associated with differences in housing 
characteristics. COMMISSION is the buyer broker commission rate offered by the listing 
agent, and is the main independent variable.  The PREMIUM DUMMY variable is used 
to capture the relationship between listings that sell at a premium and listing duration.  
Houses that sell at a premium probably do so because of competition between multiple 
buyers.  This also may create a shorter listing duration.  WEEKEND is a dummy variable 
used to measure the effects of listings that began on a Friday, Saturday, or Sunday.  
Normally, shopping for houses is a family event that occurs on the weekend.  This control 
is used to indicate that a property listed closer to the weekend improves the housing 
transaction.  Families would not want to move during the school year and force their 
children to switch schools; therefore, there might be an advantage to listing a house in the 
spring when more families are looking to purchase a home.  Previous studies have shown 
that transaction volume is higher during the spring.  The SPRING dummy measures the 
effects of listings that occurred in February, March or April.  The YEAR and COUNTY 
dummies control for the performance variation across time and location.
One would suspect that, as the listing price increases, there will be fewer potential 
buyers and the days on market will increase.  The buyer broker commission rate has 
several effects on the days on market.  First, a commission rate might encourage more 
buyer brokers to attempt to sell a particular listing, which would increase the competition 
and the days on market.  However, a higher buyer broker commission may reflect a listing 
agent’s perception of the difficulty involved with selling a particular listing.  A listing 
agent with a more difficult listing might feel the need to increase the compensation to 
buyer brokers to encourage them to pursue a listing.  By contrast, a listing agent with a 
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great property in a sellers’ market may offer a lower buyer broker commission because 
the house can sell without further incentive.  Furthermore, because commission rates are 
segmented by time and individual company policy, they may not have a large effect on 
listing time duration.
Table 4 Summary Statistics
Table 5 Frequency Statistics
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Variable
The Results
Table 6 Empirical Results
Equation (1) measures the effect on listing duration associated with changes in buyer 
broker commission rates, holding all else equal.  Somewhat surprisingly, the correlation 
between buyer broker commission and listing duration was not statistically significant.  
This suggests that parties can expect the listing duration to be unaffected by changes in 
buyer broker commission rates, and that decisions about buyer broker commission rate 
pricing should proceed without concern that it will impact listing duration.  However, 
the Equation (2) results suggest that the buyer broker commission level does have a 
statistically significant effect on the normalized discount or premium of the selling 
price compared to the listing price.  A one unit change in buyer broker commission, e.g., 
from 2% to 3%, is associated with a sale price discount of .512% from the listing price.  
One might expect that, as the buyer broker commission rate rose, it would increase 
competition and thus the ability of a property to sell for its listing price.  However, the 
data did not support this hypothesis.  This discrepancy may be explained by the theory 
that listing agents use a higher buyer broker commission to signal that a house is more 
difficult to sell.  A more challenging house will often sell at a discount.  As such, a higher 
buyer broker commission will be associated with a discount in sale price from the listing 
price.  As expected, as the list price increased so did the duration of the listing and the 
amount of the discount.  Holding all else equal, when comparing two homes, one twice 
the value of the other, the more expensive home is associated with a 38-day increase 
in listing duration and a discount of .582% compared to the less expensive home. The 
potential negative impacts of ‘steering’, which would have been seen in the data by an 
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increase in time on market and an a discount in the sale price associated with a decrease in the 
buyer broker commission rate, are not likely to be as pronounced because “the Internet offers 
consumers increased knowledge of homes available for sale and, consequently, may limit the 
ability of cooperating brokers to steer buyers away from desirable homes listed by discount 
and fee-for-service brokers.”33 According to an NAR survey, 80 percent of home buyers used 
the Internet during their home search in 2006, and 24 percent of recent home buyers first 
located the home they bought on the Internet.34
Listings that sold at or above listing price sold 18 days faster, on average, than homes 
that sold below listing price.  Clearly, homes that sell at or above listing price also sell faster 
than homes selling for below list price.  For a home to sell above listing price, competition 
normally exists among buyers shortening the time on market as each party hustles to close the 
deal.
An increase in the days on market is associated with a sale price discount of .015% per 
day.  Listings are said to become ‘stale’ as they sit on the market, and sellers are encouraged to 
lower the listing price to encourage the sale of their property.  A property that has been on the 
market for a while may have been listed with the price too high, so as time increases the seller 
either lowers the price or becomes increasingly willing to accept a lower sale price.
The correlation between weekend listings and time on market is statistically significant.  
However, the correlation between weekend listings and a discount or premium is not.  
Specifically, weekend listings (Friday, Saturday, and Sunday) are associated with a decrease 
of almost 2 days on market over listings which do not begin on the weekend.  Interestingly, 
while spring time listings (February, March, April) do not have a statistically significant 
correlation with days on market, they do have a statistically significant correlation with 
price premium.  Properties listed in the spring are associated with an increase of the overall 
premium (or a reduction of the overall discount) of .348% ceteris paribus. About 29% of 
properties enter the market in the spring, suggesting that other factors also contribute to 
the listing decision beyond seasonal effect.  Though, this result also confirms the common 
wisdom that the housing market is more active during spring season.  On average, houses 
that are sold in spring may not necessarily sell faster, but they do sell at a premium. 
Transaction location in our model acted as a control that represents deference in potential 
demand (population, home ownership rate) and supply (land, Development, etc.). Houses 
in Mercer and Somerset County are sold faster and at a higher premium relative to similar 
houses sold in Hunterdon County.  When comparing Mercer County to Hunterdon County, 
one can expect a decrease in days on market of 12 days.  The effect of location on sale price 
premium is not statistically significant between Mercer County and Hunterdon County.  
Somerset County is associated with fewer days on market (15 days fewer) and an increase in 
the premium (.164% on average) when compared to Hunterdon County.  
With just three years of market data, the data makes clear that market conditions change 
over time.  In the regression, 2003 is used as the base case.  Compared to 2003, listings in 2002 
took, on average, 56 days longer to sell and are associated with a premium of .262%.  The 2002 
and 2003 days on market data were more similar.  The market duration for a 2002 listing was, 
on average, six days longer than a 2003 listing.  The effect on the premium is not statistically 
significant between properties listed in 2002 and 2003. 
Conclusion
The present study attempted to analyze with empirical evidence the impact that the 
compensation paid to buyer brokers has on transaction performance using 16,112 broker-
33 Supra note 15.
34 National Association of Realtors Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers 34, 38 (2006) 
(Covering a 12-month period ending June 2006).
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assisted housing transactions from three New Jersey counties.  This study analyzed the 
factors affecting residential real estate performance, as measured by days on market and 
transaction premium.  With the unique control variable – buyer broker commission rate, 
we were able to assess whether a variation in commission rate affected the transaction’s 
performance.  The regression results indicate that size of the property, location, and time 
are important factors in determining sale performance.  And, while the buyer broker 
commission rate did not have a statistically significant correlation with time on market, it 
did have a statistically significant correlation with transaction price.  A higher commission 
fee was associated with a larger discount to the transaction price.  This result was 
statistically significant at the 0.001% level. For the average priced home in the data pool, 
a sale price discount of .5% associated with a 1% increase in buyer broker commission 
from the listing price represents a discount of $1,375.  In short, when the listing agent and 
homeowner enter the decision making process about the buyer broker commission rate, 
they should do so knowing that the commission rate likely will not affect the days on 
market of the transaction but may be correlated with a discounted sale price. During spring, 
transaction volume is higher than during other seasons. While houses sold in the spring 
may not necessarily sell faster, they normally trade at a premium.  Weekend listings attract 
more visitors and shorten the days on market. However, the listing dates do not have a 
statistically significant impact on trading prices.  As illustrated above, there are numerous 
factors influencing residential real estate transaction.  The role played by broker incentives 
remains an area ripe for future research.
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